INTRODUCTION
Social homogamy refers to the degree to which individuals with similar social characteristics marry each other (Burgess and Wallin 1943) . Practiced in a variety of societies, social homogamy has captured the attention of researchers interested in marriage and social stratification. In this literature, an increase in homogamy based on such attributes as socioeconomic status, education, and race and ethnicity has been considered indicative of a decline in social openness and an increase in social inequality (Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1991 Kalmijn , 1998 Smits, Ultee, and Lammers 1998; Raymo and Xie 2000; Harris and Ono 2005; Schwartz and Mare 2005; Mare and Schwartz 2006; Schwartz 2010; Torche 2010; Zijdeman and Maas 2010) .
Compared to other forms of social homogamy, age homogamy has received less attention among researchers. Age homogamy, however, is also an important indicator of social closure and gender inequality, as large age differences between spouses have been associated with more patriarchal family systems and less spousal intimacy (Van Poppel et al. 2001; Blossfeld 2009 ; Van de Putte et al. 2009 ). While the literature contains several studies on age homogamy (e.g., Atkinson and Glass 1985; Van Poppel et al. 2001; Esteve, Cortina, and Cabré 2009; Van de Putte et al. 2009 ), none deals with a long-term trend in contemporary China, particularly reform-era China.
Our study covers trends in age homogamy in China between 1960 and 2005, using indicators based on Schoen's forces of attraction (Schoen 1981 (Schoen , 1988 Qian and Preston 1993; Esteve et al. 2009 ). We use a random sample of the nationally representative China 2005 1% Population Inter-census Survey (also called 2005 mini-census). Instead of a consistent increase, as expected from the existing literature, results surprisingly show an inverted U-shaped trend in age homogamy. One plausible explanation is the reversal towards "necessity considerations" in mate-selection during the post-1990 reform era.
RESEARCH BACKGROUND Age Homogamy and Modernization
A large literature in sociology has explored trends in social homogamy (Atkinson and Glass 1985; Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1991 Kalmijn , 1993 Kalmijn , 1998 Qian 1997; Raymo and Xie 2000; Van Poppel et al. 2001; Schwartz and Mare 2005; Qian and Lichter 2007; Esteve et al. 2009; Song 2009 ; Van de Putte et al. 2009; Han 2010; Zijdeman and Maas 2010) . In this literature, social homogamy is widely considered a measure of social closure or cleavage (Smits et al. 1998; Raymo and Xie 2000; Van Poppel et al. 2001; Schwartz and Mare 2005; Zijdeman and Maas 2010) , which is generally expected to lessen during periods of economic development accompanied by more egalitarian and liberal social values (Goode 1970; Kalmijn 1991 Kalmijn , 1993 Kalmijn , 1998 Qian 1997; Raymo and Xie 2000; Qian and Lichter 2007) .
Age homogamy, however, should be conceptualized as a unique form of social homogamy and, as such, differs radically from other forms of social homogamy in its theoretical implications. Whereas homogamy in other social attributes reveals inequality and social closure, age homogamy between spouses is indicative of gender equality and social openness (Casterline, Williams, and McDonalds 1986; Wheeler and Gunter 1987; Van Poppel et al. 2001) . From a few studies of trends in age homogamy, the consensus so far is that economic development is associated with either an increase in age homogamy or no clear trend (Atkinson and Glass 1985; Qian 1998; Van Poppel et al. 2001; Esteve et al. 2009 ; Van de Putte et al. 2009; Casterline, Qian, and Liu 2010) .
To see why this is the case, let us first consider the traditional family patterns in most societies before industrialization. While we acknowledge variations in practice at both the societal and the individual levels, the traditional family is characterized by a relatively large age gap between an older, bread earner husband and his younger wife (Van Poppel et al. 2001 ). This pattern supports the patriarchal family system by reinforcing the husband's authority and impeding spousal intimacy (Cain 1993; Van Poppel et al. 2001; Barbieri, Hertrich, and Grieve 2005) . However, with industrialization and women's increasing economic roles outside the home in modern societies, the average age gap between the husband and the wife narrows. In this context, a trend towards smaller age gaps, i.e., age homogamy, is taken to indicate a change towards gender equality and love-based (as opposed to necessity-based) marriages (Bozon 1991; Van Poppel et al. 2001 ; Van de Putte et al. 2009 ).
To better understand why spousal age gap may be affected by modernization, we now turn to Kalmijn's (1991 Kalmijn's ( , 1998 general framework for explaining social homogamy. Within his framework, three sets of factors need to be considered: (1) the preferences of marriage candidates, (2) the impact of a "third party" (marriage candidates' parents, for example), and (3) the interaction structures of the marriage market. All the factors are affected, in favor of age homogamy, by the process of economic development (Smits et al. 1998; Raymo and Iwasawa 2005; Song 2009 ).
By preference, social researchers commonly mean individuals' choices free of structural constraints and motivated by their own social values and beliefs. Marriage is a social institution that binds two persons together in an intimate living relationship. Of course, people may get married for different reasons: some for economic exchange, some for family or even national interests, and some for romantic love. As a society changes from an agricultural society to a modern, industrial one, however, romance becomes increasingly the accepted and even the predominant basis for marriage (Xu and Whyte 1990; Thornton and Lin 1994) . Admittedly, persons of different ages can and do form strong bonds based on romantic love, but romance is most likely to develop when partners interact directly and share similarities in such characteristics as age, culture, tastes and physical conditions (Bhrolchain 1992; Van Poppel et al. 2001 ). Consequently, a shift to a love-based mate-selection norm is more likely to lead to smaller age differences (Wheeler and Gunter 1987; Bozon 1991; Van Poppel et al. 2001) .
Moreover, it is well established that as a society is transformed from an agriculture-based to an industry-based economy, individuals themselves rather than parents or other authority figures increasingly make decisions about family-related behaviors (Goode 1970; Xu and Whyte 1990 ; Thornton and Lin 1994; Thornton 2001; Barbieri et al. 2005; Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007) . That is, one clear implication of development is the diminished impact of the "third party" and the freedom of young individuals to choose their own mates. When youth are left on their own to choose their potential spouses, their choices may be limited to those whom they know best -most likely peers of similar ages to their own -and thus reduce the spousal age difference (Casterline et al. 1986; Wheeler and Gunter 1987; Bozon 1991; Van Poppel et al. 2001) .
Besides preference and the impact of the "third party," the structure of the marriage market can also be affected by economic development (Bytheway 1981; Atkinson and Glass 1985; Vera, Berardo, and Berardo 1985; Kalmijn 1991 Kalmijn , 1998 Bhrolchain 1992; Stier and Shavit 1994; Lichter, Anderson, and Hayward 1995; Todd, Billari, and Simão 2005) . For example, with industrialization, educational attainment generally increases. As a result, youth spend an increasingly large fraction of their pre-marital years in school, resulting in a much higher probability of finding a spouse among schoolmates before completing their education. This may be especially true for those receiving higher education, as the timing for pursuing postsecondary education is highly similar to that for selecting marriage partners. Therefore, lengthened education completion may transform postsecondary institutions into important marriage markets and thus may increase the incidence of age homogamy between schoolmates (Mare 1991; Blossfeld and Timm 2003) .
For these reasons, a consensus emerges in the existing literature that economic development should generally lead to a rise in age homogamy. This prevailing theoretical view is also supported by empirical evidence from a variety of countries. For example, a recent study by Casterline et al. (2010) reports that out of the twenty-four developing countries under study, seventeen experienced an increase in percentages of couples with age gaps (husband's minus wife's) between 0-5 years (zero and five included). The increases ranged from as low as 0.2% for 63.3% in 1960 and 69.9% in 1980 (Atkinson and Glass 1985 . The percentage of marriages with age gaps less than two years (two excluded) rose by 7%-20% for the Dutch regions between 1812 and 1913 (Van de Putte et al. 2009 ). The proportion of spouses within the same five-year age categories (five included) increased from 35% in the mid-nineteenth century to more than 50% in the 1970s and early 1980s for the Netherlands (Van Poppel et al. 2001) . The same percentage for Spain increased from 36% in 1944 to 49% in 2000 (Esteve et al. 2009 ). Thus, previous studies all indicate a secular decline in the age gap between spouses, particularly during periods of development. Is this generalization universal? Specifically, does it hold true for China in its recent past?
The Chinese Context
The People's Republic of China was founded in 1949 after the Communist Revolution.
For the first 30 years, China suffered from numerous political conflicts, and the Communist ideology for equality prevailed (Meisner 1999; Whyte 2010) . In 1978, China began its economic reform, leading to dramatic improvements in economic and educational outcomes (Xie and Hannum 1996; Qian 2000; Wu and Xie 2003; Hauser and Xie 2005; Whyte 2010 According to the existing literature we reviewed in the preceding subsection, these changes should all have been in favor of increasing age homogamy for contemporary China. Has the actual trend been a steady increase in age homogamy? This is an empirical question that we address in this paper.
DATA AND METHODS
This study uses both descriptive statistics and homogamy indicators based on "forces of attraction" (Qian and Preston 1993; Esteve et al. 2009 ). In order to examine the robustness of the descriptive results, we also apply log-multiplicative layer effect models using year of marriage as 
Analytical Samples
We first restrict our analysis to individuals aged 15 and older in order to exclude those ineligible for marriage. Next, to compute forces of attraction, we construct, for each year being studied, For the "couples" subsample, we restrict the data to those couples in which both partners were married for the first time that year, forming the marriage cohort. These restrictions result in a total of 459,721 couples for marriage cohorts between 1960 and 2005. We use this larger "couple" sample for descriptive analyses and log-multiplicative layer effect models. However, to compute homogamy indicators based on forces of attraction, we further restrict the sample to couples with both partners' ages at first marriage between 15 and 50 corresponding to the assumed marriageable age range. This additional restriction reduced only a small number of cases, resulting in a total of 459,291 couples.
Past studies on trends in homogamy have relied on repeated cross-sectional data of recently contracted marriages or newlyweds, to avoid bias from selective marital dissolution or remarriage (e.g., Mare 1991; Qian and Preston 1993; Kalmijn 1994; Qian 1998; Raymo and Xie 2000; Schwartz and Mare 2005) . Note that information about age at marriage is available only on the 2005 mini-census but on not regular censuses. We capitalize on this unique feature of the 2005 mini-census data and reconstruct, retrospectively, the experiences of marriage cohorts from this later cross-sectional dataset. Due to data limitation, we restrict our analysis to first marriages, and as based on the abovementioned literature, this may introduce a bias to our study. Given the very low divorce rates in China throughout this period, however, we do not see this as a severe problem. 3 Still, it is useful to speculate on the direction of such biases. As many scholars of marriage have argued, larger spousal age differences often predict higher risks of divorce (Day 1964; Bumpass and Sweet 1972; Levinger 1976; Wilson and Smallwood 2008) , and additionally, higher marriage parity usually relates to larger spousal age gaps (Dean and Gurak 1978; Atkinson and Glass 1985; Vera et al. 1985; Bhrolchain 1992) . Given the rise in divorce rates, our focus on the prevailing first marriages is likely to exert a bias towards a heightened trend in age homogamy, increasingly so for more recent periods. Thus, our sample may include a disproportionately higher proportion of younger marriages for this age group. According to the literature, later marriages usually relate to larger age gaps (Qian 1998; Van Poppel et al. 2001 ). Hence, there should be an overestimation for the level of age homogamy for later marriage cohorts due to higher percentage of younger age groups in those cohorts.
Homogamy Indicators
The concept of force of attraction was first introduced by Schoen (1981 Schoen ( , 1988 . It is a special type of marriage rate based on the harmonic mean of single males and females, i.e., those at risk of marriage, for each spousal age combination. The mathematical formula of force of attraction is:
in which ij m indicates the number of marriages between males aged i and females aged j ; i H and j W respectively identifies the number of eligible males at age i and that of eligible females at age j ; n is length of the age intervals. In this formula, the number of marriages that are actually contracted is considered along with the amount of potential exposure between eligible males aged i and females aged j . Thus, the population at risk of marriage is taken into account. Compared to investigation only considering prevailing marriages, our analysis controls for changes in age-sex composition of the marriage market.
For each marriage cohort, we calculate a homogamy indicator based on forces of attraction (Esteve et al. 2009 ). The homogamy indicator is the ratio of sum of forces of attraction ( ij  as defined in Equation (1)) where i equals j , over the sum of all forces of attraction. This indicator reflects the strength of preferences for age homogamy over the overall distribution of couples. It ranges from 0 to 1 -the larger the indicator, the stronger the preference for age homogamy.
We construct forces of attraction and homogamy indicators respectively with single-year, three-year and five-year age groups. As Van Poppel and colleagues (2001) demonstrated, dividing age at marriage into groups with mandatorily determined boundaries and widths can only identify level of heterogamy with relatively large spousal age gaps and thus may produce inaccurate results. Furthermore, this approach may classify some marriages with a small age gap (eg., with husband marrying at 35 and wife at 34) as heterogamy, while classifying others with a large age gap (with husband marrying at 34 and wife at 30) as homogamy. Therefore, experimenting with changing age groupings enables us to mitigate the negative impact of categorization by observing robustness of the results. These different groupings can also provide levels of age homogamy based on definitions of varying strictness. While homogamy indicators with single-year age groups define age homogamy in the most conservative sense, those with five-year age groups provide much more liberal definitions. We obtain a similar inverted U-shaped trend using homogamy indicators by forces of attraction, with all three age groupings. As can be seen in Figure 2 , level of age homogamy rose continuously after 1960 but dropped from the early 1990s on. This analysis is not a repetition of those shown in Figure 1 . By using homogamy indicators, we can evaluate underlying preferences of age homogamy while controlling for the confounding influence of the age-sex composition of the marriage market.
RESULTS
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. 6 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Marriage Cohort single year three years five years However, since the early 1990s, the trend started to reverse, leading to an inverted U-shape for the entire period under study.
Is the reversal real? In order to observe the trends more clearly, we computed moving averages for the three sets of homogamy indicators, with equal and varying weights for the adjacent three, five, seven, nine and eleven marriage cohorts respectively. Appendix Tables A1 to A3 contain computed homogamy indicators based on the three sets of age groupings. As can be seen from these results, the inverted U-shaped trend in age homogamy holds true for all different age groups and for varying methods of computing moving averages. Among them, the trend based on three-year age groups is especially sharp. Therefore, we present in Figure 3 the trends based on three-year age groups respectively with raw homogamy indicators and their moving averages for the adjacent seven marriage cohorts with equal weights. . 28 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Marriage Cohort moving average raw Note: Raw homogamy indicators are constructed as the ratio of sum of forces of attraction (as defined in Equation (1) sharp increase until the early 1990s, when a drop began. We also conduct analysis based on logmultiplicative layer effect models (Xie 1992; Raymo and Xie 2000) with varying design matrices, and an inverted U-shaped trend keeps showing for all the models used.
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As discussed earlier, all of our sample construction and restriction methods should lead to overestimation of levels of age homogamy for later marriage cohorts. Regarding this, we consider the observed reversal of the trend in age homogamy, from more homogamy to less homgamy after the early 1990s, conservative. The actual reversal without the data limitations should even be more pronounced than that revealed by our data.
Separation of Hypogamy and Hypergamy
As shown above, a consistent increase in levels of age homogamy along the course of development was disrupted during the post-1990 reform era. A decline in age homogamy in the more recent period suggests that either hypogamy (i.e., an older wife marrying a younger husband) or hypergamy (i.e., a younger wife marrying an older husband), or both, has increased.
However, theoretical implications of these two alternatives are quite different. For example, while an increase in age hypogamy may indicate more liberal attitudes on gender relations and marriage, a rise in age hypergamy may reflect quite the opposite, with the husband resuming their power over the wife. Therefore, distinguishing changes in either age hypogamy or hypergamy could shed light on the potential explanations for the reversal trend in age homogamy.
As can be seen in Figure 4 , the trend in age hypogamy increased from 1960 all the way towards early 1990s and decreased afterwards. While we may attribute the increase to more liberal attitudes on age differences in the earlier period, the decrease in the more recent period is puzzling. However, for our purpose of explaining the recent decrease in age homogamy, this tells us that more older women marrying younger husbands is not likely to be the reason for the decline in age homogamy in the more recent period. The pattern shown by Figure 5 echoes those pertaining to age homogamy in Figures 1 to   3 . That is, during the most recent post-reform era since the early 1990s, more individuals have retreated from age homogamy and chosen age hypergamy instead. Why hypergamy? What is so special about the post-1990 reform era? In the next section we will discuss a possible explanation for the reversal in age homogamy.
Economic Pressure: An Explanation for the Reversal
At first glance, the decrease in marital age homogamy and the corresponding increase in age hypergamy since the early 1990s are surprising in terms of the widely believed positive relationship between age homogamy and development. However, as mentioned earlier, status hypergamy was widely practiced in traditional China (Thornton and Lin 1994; Xie and Zhu 2009 ). Thus, while age hypergamy was substantially eroded after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, there may be reasons for it to return in the post-1990 reform period.
In contrast with other periods examined in this paper, the reform era has been one not only of rapid economic growth and a sharp increase in standard of living, but also of a tremendous rise in consumer aspirations accompanied by increasingly severe market competition.
Those social forces may have influenced marital decisions in different or even opposite ways.
First, from the bride's standpoint, increasingly severe competition within the labor market during the post-1990 reform era may have brought women back to a disadvantaged position. Some researchers (Summerfield 1994; Zhang et al. 2008 ) have found that a narrow emphasis on short-term efficiency and profit-making among many companies during more recent reform-era has led to greater discrimination against women within the labor market. In recent years, women's unemployment increased significantly (Summerfield 1994 ; Wu and Song 2010: Table 2 ). Facing this new, unfavorable labor market environment, many women may be involuntarily forced back into traditional homemaker roles. In light of their "downgraded" role in the labor market, marrying a "good" husband with respect to his socioeconomic conditions has once again become an attractive channel to higher social status. Since older men are more likely to possess higher social status and greater economic potential, this may make older husbands more appealing (Bozon 1991) .
Second, from the groom's standpoint, men now also face increasingly fierce market competition and higher costs of establishing households. Women's resumption of housewife roles and retreat to the necessity considerations may be associated with men's increasing problems in matters of career and marriage. Just as women are forced back into the role of homemakers, men are now more likely to be stuck in the role of bread earners. Considering the conventional practice of status hypergamy, men also face greater pressures to accumulate richer socioeconomic resources given women's enhanced educational profiles (Raymo and Iwasawa 2005) . Thus, they have to compete in both the labor and the marriage markets, with competition ever more intense on both fronts. To become more attractive to women during this double contest, men need to wait longer while accumulating resources (Thornton, Axinn and Teachman 1995; Smock and Manning 1997; Xie et al. 2003) .
Therefore, while women may begin to marry older men in response to their occupational downgrades, men may need to settle down later by virtue of the double competitions they face.
These tendencies, generated by the economic reforms, may eventually have led to larger age gaps between husbands and wives in the later stage of the reform. That is, the positive influence of economic growth on age homogamy may have been counteracted by an opposing social force resulting from increased market competition. The same process of the reform that helped narrow spousal age gaps in the early years may, since the early 1990s, have contributed to the widening of spousal age gaps due to intensified competition. For convenience, we call this the "economic pressure" explanation.
Theoretically speaking, status hypergamy can be attained through a variety of channels.
Women can marry up in terms of achieved traits such as education and occupation, or ascribed traits such as family origins and race/ethnicity. Among these domains, age and education are especially important. Age is tightly related to overall socioeconomic status, since older individuals are more likely to accumulate greater cultural and social resources (Van Poppel et al. 2001 ). Moreover, a normative large spousal age gap with the husband older than the wife is believed to efficiently facilitate the traditional division of labor within the household (Wheeler and Gunter 1987; Van Poppel et al. 2001 ). Thus, women may marry older husbands with established status so as to achieve status hypergamy (Bozon 1991 Note that women's educational attainment has increased dramatically during China's post-1949 history (Lavely et al. 1990 ), resulting in a rapid narrowing of the gender gap in education (Hannum and Xie 1994; Hannum 2005) . This trend may be a unique contributing factor in reversing the trend towards age homogamy. While the economic pressure for status hypergamy intensified during the post-1990 reform era, it also became increasingly difficult for highly educated women to find husbands with enough education to satisfy the expectation of education-based hypergamy. In Figure 6 , for example, we observe that, since the late 1970s and especially since the early 1990s, males' and females' educational levels have gradually converged. Specifically, the ratio of spousal educational gap (husband's minus wife's) to wives' years of schooling has decreased from as high as 0.27 in 1960 all the way down towards 0.03 in 2005. The narrowing gender gap in education has made it ever more difficult to practice hypergamy with respect to education. Thus, couples may elect to achieve hypergamy instead by means of age, widening the age gap so that the husband still maintains an economic advantage over his similarly educated but less experienced wife. Therefore, during the post-1990 reform era, the notion of "marrying up" may have reemerged with a different meaning: the husband tending to be older and economically better off than the wife, though not necessarily better educated. To test this conjecture, we conduct an auxiliary analysis based on a revised version of Mincer's (1974) human capital model. In this analysis, we consider what possible role the narrowing gender educational gap may have played as a concrete causal mechanism for the economic pressure explanation. Because we do not have perfect data for this part, this analysis is intended mainly to demonstrate the relevance of this causal mechanism. The key idea is that the spousal age gap may serve to compensate for the decreased spousal educational gap so as to maintain status hypergamy. That is, during the later stage of the economic reform, age may have begun to substitute for education as an effective proxy for men's richer socioeconomic resources, in the face of emerging convergence in educational attainment by gender.
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We compare husbands' earnings premiums by holding average educational attainment and average age at first marriage at different levels for each marriage cohort. Lacking historical data on couples' earnings at the time of marriage, we instead resort to an estimation of their potential earnings through a revised version of Mincer's (1974) human capital model, in which the estimated earnings of the year of marriage are based on the average educational attainment and years of work experience for each marriage cohort. Specifically, we use the following equation for each sex:
where Y is earnings, X 1 years of schooling, and X 2 years of work experience. All  's are unknown parameters, and  is the residual unexplained by the model. Equation (2) deviates from Mincer's model in that it does not include the quadratic term of years of work experience.
This is reasonable given that we restrict the analysis to persons aged between 20 and 30, the age range in which most marriages occur and work experience increases earnings steadily. Thus, inclusion of the quadratic term is not theoretically compelling and may result in a loss of precision and predictive power of the model.
We use data from Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 1988 (CHIP) , 1995 (CHIP) and 2002 to estimate  's in Equation (2), respectively for marriage cohorts 1985-1991, 1992-1998 and 1999-2005 . We use data only for urban workers because personal earnings are ambiguous for rural residents in CHIP. Again, because our main objective here is illustrative, a systematic bias in the auxiliary analysis resulted from the restriction to urban workers should not invalidate the substantive conclusion. Given our specific purpose to estimate husbands' earnings premiums, as homogamy still decreases in the post-1990 reform era, we can claim stronger evidence for the potential return to necessity considerations in mate selection.
well as the gender differential in returns to education and experience, we estimate Equation (2) separately for men and women. Combined with other criteria for excluding observations with missing or incomplete data, this procedure yields samples of 2,052 men and 2,321 women from Once we obtain estimated  's, we apply average years of schooling and average age at first marriage for each marriage cohort using 2005 mini-census data to the regression equations so as to estimate earnings at the time of marriage. Here we extrapolated years of work experience from years of schooling and age at first marriage. In the end, we are able to estimate husband' earnings premiums to wives' with 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Based on results from descriptive statistics and homogamy indicators, a consistent pattern emerges that begs explanation. As expected, during the general process of development in China, there was a salient increase in marital age homogamy, and this increasing tendency continued into the early post-reform era around the early 1990s. The increase in age homogamy is further facilitated by the dramatic change in education. With a rising proportion of the population receiving postsecondary education, the role of postsecondary institutions as major marriage markets should become more prominent. This should have resulted in more homogamy based on both age and education. Thus, there are good reasons to expect this trend of increasing age homogamy to continue.
However, the empirical pattern has been different, as the trend began to change in post-1990 years, at a time when the economic reform in China was implemented more widely and more thoroughly. Results using different methods all consistently show a conspicuous inverted U-shaped trend for age homogamy. Correspondingly, there has been a U-shaped trend for age hypergamy. The combination of these two trends indicates the retreat to necessity considerations for mate selection in the face of increasingly severe economic pressures. For women, they may have tried to resume status hypergamy in response to their own "downgraded" occupational prospects during the post-1990 reform era. Note that, given the convergence in educational attainment by gender, educational hypergamy is harder to achieve than before. Therefore, age hypergamy has become an increasingly important channel towards status hypergamy. Men, on the other hand, may need to wait longer so as to accumulate richer resources and to become more attractive on the marriage market regarding their resumed bread earner roles and women's enhanced educational profiles. All these changes during the post-1990 reform era may have subverted the increasing trend in age homogamy and instead promoted age hypergamy.
Also, as can be seen from the auxiliary analysis using the human capital model, sharp differences are shown across the four trends by the combination of education and age at first marriage at the level of 1985 or their actual levels. This indirectly supports our conjecture that larger spousal age gaps in the post-1990 reform era served to compensate for the rapidly reduced spousal educational gap, so as to maintain the convention of status hypergamy.
In summary, this study is an empirical investigation of the long-term trend in marital age homogamy in contemporary China, with a surprising finding of the trend being reversed, from an increase to a decrease, in the post-1990 economic reform era. We proposed economic pressure during the late economic reform era as the explanation of this reversal in trend. We further explored an implication of this explanation with an analysis of a related trend -changes in educational attainment -and found it to be plausible as a causal mechanism of the reversal.
We are aware that Qian (1998) and Van Poppel et al. (2001) have both presented a reversal of the increasing trend in age homogamy respectively for the United States and the Netherlands. These two studies explained the reversal with delays in marriage and increasing prevalence of cohabitation. We note that the intensification of China's economic reform since the 1990s has also coincided with a period of delayed marriages and an emergence of cohabitation in China (Jiang 2002; Jin, Li and Feldman 2003; Xu, Qiang and Wang 2003; Shi 2010) . However, both a delay in marriage and the choice of cohabitation over marriage can also be interpreted as resulting from a heightened pressure for household establishments (Thornton et al. 1995; Xie et al. 2003; Thornton et al. 2007 ). Therefore, our "economic pressure" explanation, as much as it is unique for China's reform era, is also consistent with those for trends in age homogamy in other countries.
We also recognize that some important pieces are missing from this puzzle. First, as a number of researchers have argued, both remarriage and cohabitation may have a large influence on the resulting spousal age gaps (Bytheway 1981; Atkinson and Glass 1985; Vera et al. 1985; Bhrolchain 1992; Stier and Shavit 1994; Todd et al. 2005 ). These two phenomena may even become more relevant considering their greater prevalence during reform-era China. It is unfortunate that our dataset does not include information on either of the phenomena, but this limitation should serve as a good starting point for future research. Second, due to the salient rural-urban divide in China regarding their remarkably differential processes of social and economic development (Xie and Hannum 1996; Hauser and Xie 2005) , our estimation of returns to education and work experience based on the CHIP urban samples is limited. Although we only expect the levels of husbands' earnings premiums to change across the rural-urban divide, it is still worthwhile to conduct separate analyses based on respective rural and urban samples so as to establish more accurate conclusions. Last, Mare and Schwartz (2006) and Torche (2010) 's works have shown fruitfulness in directly incorporating measures of husbands' earnings premiums into their log-linear models of educational homogamy. This would be a more straightforward way to test our "economic pressure" explanation. However, this analysis requires information on the spouses' respective education and earnings at the time of marriage, which is unavailable in our dataset used.
These limitations will serve as good starting points for the future research on marital age homogamy, as well as studies of other crucial social changes taking place in contemporary China. We also welcome further research on age homogamy in other countries or with crossnational perspectives. Research on this topic shall shed new light on the changing patterns of gender norms, gender stratification, and family behaviors across the world. Note: Homogamy indicators are constructed by the forces of attraction based on age groups of one year. Specifically, the groups are the single ages for those aged between 20 and 35 and we combine those under age 20 as a group 15-19 and those above age 35 as two groups 36-40 and 41-50. Moving averages are calculated to smooth the trend, and are computed respectively with equal and varying weights for the adjacent 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 marriage cohorts. For those with three adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively ¼, ½ and ¼; for those with five adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/9, 2/9, 1/3, 2/9 and 1/9; for those with seven adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/ Note: Homogamy indicators are constructed by the forces of attraction based on age groups of five years. Specifically, we divide individuals into age groups 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-35, 36-40 and 41-50 . Moving averages are calculated to smooth the trend, and are computed respectively with equal and varying weights for the adjacent 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 marriage cohorts. For those with three adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively ¼, ½ and ¼; for those with five adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/9, 2/9, 1/3, 2/9 and 1/9; for those with seven adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/16, 1/8, 3/16, 1/4, 3/16, 1/8 and 1/16; for those with nine adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/25, 2/25, 3/25, 4/25, 1/5, 4/25, 3/25, 2/25 and 1/25; for those with eleven adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/36, 1/18, 1/12, 1/9, 5/36, 1/6, 5/36, 1/9, 1/12, 1/18 and 1/36.
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